Publications:

Dualism Leads to Many Minds. Synthese, 205(2) (2025).
Link

I argue that, if naturalistic dualism about consciousness is true, there are many conscious beings in the immediate vicinity of each of us. I give two arguments for this conclusion: an argument from analogy and an argument from inference to the best explanation. Both adapt traditional arguments for the existence of other minds. Together, they pose a novel challenge to naturalistic dualism. They also undermine a recent family of arguments for dualism in general and for substance dualism in particular.

Vague Perception. Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 977–999 (2024).
Link | Penultimate draft

I argue that some perceptual experiences are vague. To do so, I identify a characteristic feature of vagueness and show that some perceptual experiences have this feature. These include blurry experiences, experiences of color under low lighting, and experiences of number, as in the case of the speckled hen. The conclusion that these experiences are vague has two noteworthy consequences. First, it presses us to see whether and how existing theories of vagueness can be extended to perceptual experience. Second, it sheds light on several puzzles in the philosophy of perception.

Dissertation:

What, if Anything, Would Be Good for a Robot?

This dissertation explores the welfare of artificially intelligent beings (AIs). The first chapter argues that the capacity to have desires, without the capacity to feel pleasure or pain, does not suffice for welfare subjecthood. So near-future AIs will likely not be welfare subjects. Nevertheless, uncertainty about this issue, as well as the longer-term prospect of conscious AIs, gives us reason to explore what would be good for an AI. The second and third chapters examine the welfare implications of two properties AIs can have: disembodiment and a biologically unconstrained lifespan. The second chapter argues that it would be good for an AI to be embodied. The third chapter argues that an extremely long life, even if it is always drab, can be extremely high in welfare. This thesis also has implications for population ethics.

Works in progress:

A paper on well-being and time (under review)

A paper on well-being, embodiment, and AI (under review)

A paper on options and blameworthiness (under review)

A paper on whether desire suffices for welfare subjecthood

A paper on morality and the mental problem of the many

(email me for drafts)