Publications
"Dualism Leads to Many Minds," (forth.) Synthese [Penultimate draft]
“Vague Perception,” (2024) Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 977–999. [Link] [Penultimate draft]
- I argue that, if naturalistic dualism about consciousness is true, there are many conscious beings in the immediate vicinity of each of us. I give two arguments for this conclusion: an argument from analogy and an argument from inference to the best explanation. Both adapt traditional arguments for the existence of other minds. Together, they pose a novel challenge for naturalistic dualism. They also undermine a recent family of arguments for dualism in general and for substance dualism in particular.
“Vague Perception,” (2024) Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 977–999. [Link] [Penultimate draft]
- I argue that some perceptual experiences are vague. To do so, I identify a characteristic feature of vagueness and show that some perceptual experiences have this feature. These include blurry experiences, experiences of color under low lighting, and experiences of number, as in the case of the speckled hen. The conclusion that these experiences are vague has two noteworthy consequences. First, it presses us to see whether and how existing theories of vagueness can be extended to perceptual experience. Second, it sheds light on several puzzles in the philosophy of perception.
Dissertation
“Papers on Well-being and Consciousness”
- This is a collection of five essays about the good life, consciousness, and connections between them. The papers range from theoretical to applied: they draw on tools from decision theory and philosophy of mind, and they discuss the welfare of artificially intelligent agents and non-human animals. They address questions including: Do all conscious beings enjoy welfare and therefore moral status? Are there any welfare goods that are not blips of pleasure, and how important are these goods? What does the existence of these goods imply for the structure of welfare over time? In what ways is the good life an aggregate—across times, across goods—vs. an organic unity? What issues does AI raise for the study of welfare?
Works in progress (email me for drafts)
A paper about well-being over time and the Millian lexical superiority view (under review)
A paper about embodiment and AI welfare
A paper about the moral implications of the possibility that each of us overlaps many conscious beings
A paper about embodiment and AI welfare
A paper about the moral implications of the possibility that each of us overlaps many conscious beings